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ABSTRACT
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is extensively applied in various multifactor authen-
tication protocols. In this work, various recent ECC based authentication and key ex-
change protocols are subjected to threat modeling and static analysis to detect vulnera-
bilities, and to enhance them to be more secure against threats. This work demonstrates
how currently used ECC based protocols are vulnerable to attacks. If protocols are vul-
nerable, damages could include critical data loss and elevated privacy concerns. The
protocols considered in this work differ in their usage of security factors (e.g. passwords,
pins, and biometrics), encryption and timestamps. The threat model considers differ-
ent types of attacks including man in the middle, weak authentication, denial of service
and SQL injection. Countermeasures to reduce or prevent such attacks are suggested.
Beyond cryptanalysis of recent schemes and suggestion of new schemes, the proposed
adversary model and criteria put forth a guideline for the methodic assessment of forth-
coming multi-factor authentication proposals.
xi
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
In a cybersecurity domain, user authentication implements a perimeter device (proxy
server, firewall, remote access server, VPN server, etc.) to judge if to allow an individual
user’s request to attain access to the network wall. The authentication is usually two-
way, implying both entities (provider and user) validate themselves to each other (Khat-
wani and Roy, 2015). Client authentication requires security for remote login in the time
the client’s channel is making efforts to connect to the server’s channel over unsafe net-
works. The identity and a secret password of a client are used for mutual authentication
and access control. However, a password may be exposed while transmission if a suit-
able scheme is missing.
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is an extensively applied technique in multi-factor
authentication (Khatwani and Roy, 2015). ECC is a public key encryption approach set
on elliptic curve theory that are used to create faster, smaller, and productive crypto-
graphic keys. The keys are generated using the properties of the elliptic curve equation.
This technology may be utilized in parallelism with almost all public key encryption
techniques, like Diffie-Hellman and RSA. (Burr, 2016). ECC was introduced to mini-
mize computational costs while providing equal layer of security as other familiar op-
erations (such as modular exponentiation). The technique of ECC has applications in
authentication protocols concerning RFIDs, digital signatures, wireless networks, smart
cards, and other authentication techniques (Abidi et al., 2014; Choi et al., 2014; Chuang
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et al., 2015; Jin et al., 2015; Yeh et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2015). However, the computa-
tional cost of one bilinear pairing (a crucial operation of ECC) is almost twice as high
as a single modular exponentiation operation at the equal level of security (Farash and
Ahmadian-Attari, 2014). Hence, the computationally intensive character of ECC yields
a security flaw in the protocols that use it. An adversary may compel the client or server
to repeatedly execute ECC operations in order to clog them, resulting in resources being
wasted by performing unwanted calculations. In this thesis, we are looking at two differ-
ent types of schemes that use ECC, one being multi factor authentication and the other
being key-exchange.
Multi-factor authentication is a method wherein the user is required to render more
than one form of validation to confirm user’s identity and grant access to the structure.
This takes leverage of a mix of many forms of authentication. The major forms contain
verification by: (1) something a user knows (such as a password), (2) something the user
has (such as a smart card or a security token), and (3) something the user is (such as a
biometric characteristic). Due to their advance difficulty, authentication systems that
use multi-factor verification are tougher to breach than those that use a single factor
(Bhargav-Spantzel et al., 2007; Owen and Shoemaker, 2008; Khatwani and Roy, 2015;
Sabzevar and Stavrou, 2008).
Key exchange is a cryptographic method by which secret keys are interchanged between
two parties, with the use of a cryptographic algorithm. Public key cryptography, or asym-
metric cryptography, is a cryptographic system that uses pairs of public and private keys.
Each party has their own public key and private key. The message is encrypted using the
public key and decrypted using one’s private key. The public key is distributed and the
private key is known only to the owner. If sender and receiver wish to communicate with
each other, then a secret key is shared between them in order for communication to take
– 2 –
place. Symmetric key algorithms use the same cryptographic keys for both encryption
and decryption of text. The key exchange problem is how to exchange information so
that no third party can obtain a copy. Typically, this has required trusted couriers or a
secure channel.
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a method of electronic identification which
makes use of radio waves to detect, track, identify, and therefore manage a collection
of objects. Despite the fact that this technology exists for over half a century, only re-
cently have RFID privacy and security concerns started to invite awareness from cor-
porate and academic research. RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) technology has
become ubiquitous because of its low cost. Since it is used in many fields, any vulnera-
bility detected in RFID technology, raises a threat in data privacy. Similarly, the potential
for Smart Cards is enormous. However, by far the most serious problem for smart cards
is the attacks that exploit security vulnerabilities caused by poor design or implemen-
tation. These vulnerabilities tend to be easy to exploit and replicate, and are, therefore,
shared among the hackers community.
1.2 Problem Statement, Goal and Contribution
ECC is a multi-factor encryption technique currently used by the US government, Tor,
Bitcoin, iMessage, and SSL/TLS. Such multi-factor authentication is required to pro-
duce higher level of security, however the establishment of other elements introduces
more vulnerability in the protocols. Our goal is to detect these vulnerabilities before
they are abused. The root causes of many common vulnerabilities like CPU resource-
exhaustion, stack overflow, etc., are usually design flaws instead of programming (im-
plementation) errors (Chang et al., 2009). Therefore developers perform static analysis
on protocols to identify design flaws in order to ensure security before a program (soft-
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ware product) is launched.
Several multi-factor authentication protocols that involve RFIDs, smart cards, wireless
networks, or digital signatures entrust ECC operations for their security. However, the
computational cost of one bilinear pairing (a crucial operation of ECC) is almost twice
as high as a single modular exponentiation at the equal level of security. Hence, the
computationally intensive behavior of ECC yield a security loophole in the protocols.
Therefore, a level of protection need to be added to ECC-based protocols to affirm over-
all security toward different types of attacks such as denial of service, man in the middle
and database attacks.
The problem addressed by this thesis is that the vulnerabilities of ECC based protocols
are not recognized. The first goal of this work is to perform static analysis on the un-
derlying vulnerabilities and security threats that exist in ECC based protocols that are
implemented in RFIDs and Smart Cards. The second goal is to design possible counter-
measures to defeat the identified vulnerabilities in these protocols. The contribution of
this research is to provide basis for future work in developing the security of ECC based
protocols using dynamic analysis. The results of this work will contribute to the cyber-
security community in a considerable way.
1.3 Organization of this Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains the literature review
and gives the necessary technical background. Chapter 3 introduces static vulnerability
analysis and the threat model and Chapter 4 describes the cryptanalysis algorithms and
discusses the type of protocols that were investigated in this work. Chapter 5 describes
in detail the work done in this thesis to cryptanalyze various protocols. It describes
– 4 –
the attacks that were carried out on the protocols, and proposes countermeasures for
each attack. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the results, conclusions and suggests future
directions.
– 5 –
Chapter 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
ECC is one of the most accomplished and widely used, however least understood, cryp-
tography tools (Sullivan, 2013). It is the future generation of public key cryptography. It
provides significantly more security than first-generation public key cryptography sys-
tems like RSA (Sullivan, 2013).
2.1 ECC Background
ECC is a technique in public key cryptography set on the algebraic arrangement of ellip-
tic curves over finite fields. Compared to non-ECC cryptography, ECC provides equiv-
alent security with smaller keys (Hankerson et al., 2006) (Graham et al., 2016). The
elliptic curve cryptosystem (Hankerson et al., 2006) was initially proposed as a basis for
public key cryptosystems and it has proved out to be an important unit of current cryp-
tography (Koblitz, 1987). ECC utilizes the mathematics of elliptic curves. The security
of ECC lies in the complexity of working the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
An analysis of ECC theory and its computational problems are stated below.
2.2 Theory of Elliptic Curves
As shown in Figure 2.1, Elliptic curves (Eq (a,b)) are set of points defined by the solu-
tions to the equation y2 ≡ x3 +ax +b( mod q), where a and b are elements of the field
k together with a point at infinity O (Koc, 2013). There is also a condition such that
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Figure 2.1: Elliptic Curve Addition (Guide, 2014)
4a3 + 27b3 6= 0 (mod q) where q is a prime number (Koc, 2013). This equation must
be satisfied for the elliptic curve to have a well-defined group structure. This forms an
additive cyclic group E = {(x, y) ∈ Eq (a,b)}∪ {O}, where O serves as an additive identity
element of the group (Koc, 2013). If P is a point in E andk is a positive integer, then the
point multiplication is computed by repeated addition, such as, k ·P = P+P ···+P , where
k is a large integer and P is added to itself k times.
2.2.1 Computational Nature of ECC
ECC is a computationally intensive operation. Its scalar multiplication is one-way, mak-
ing it computationally infeasible to trace the original number. For Example:Let P be a
point in E , and let Q be a point such that Q = kP . The elliptic curve discrete log problem
is the following: knowing the values of P and Q, determine the value of k. If the modulus
q is large, the ECDLP is computationally infeasible. ECC is based on this problem. Even
if P and Q are known, determining k such that Q = kP 1 is computationally infeasible.
Hence the elliptic curve discrete log problem makes k difficult to compute.
1kP and k ·P has the same meaning in ECC multiplication
– 7 –
2.2.2 Strengths of ECC
The strengths of Elliptic Curve Cryptography are as below:
• Elliptic curve discrete logarithm: Its security lies in its one way multiplication,
which gives it a strong trapdoor function (Blake et al., 1999; Vanstone, 1997). A
trapdoor function is a function that is simple to calculate in one direction, but
difficult to calculate in the opposite direction (i.e finding its inverse) without suffi-
cient information, called the "trapdoor". Trapdoor functions are extensively used
in cryptography (Wikipedia, 2016c).
• Similar strength: It offers similar strength as compared to RSA with a small key
size.
• More secure: It is considered to be the most secure cryptosystem (Blake et al.,
1999; Vanstone, 1997).
• More efficient: It is proven to be more efficient than the first generation cryptog-
raphy systems (Blake et al., 1999; Vanstone, 1997).
• Uses less CPU resources: It causes less overhead as compared to RSA, as it uses
shorter encryption keys, and uses less memory than other schemes such as Diffie-
Hellman, and therefore is faster than RSA (Gura et al., 2004; GlobalSign, 2015;
Lauter, 2004).
2.2.3 Comparison between ECC and RSA
The RSA cryptosystem is an alternate technique used in encryption and authentication
protocols that was discovered by (Rivest et al., 1978). RSA uses a technique called mod-
– 8 –
ular exponentiation to guarantee security. Table 2.1 compares the sizes of ECC and RSA
keys. The key sizes for ECC are considerably smaller than RSA for the same level of secu-
rity.
ECC Key Size (bits) RSA Key Size (bits) Key Size Ratio
163 1,024 1:6
256 3,072 1:12
384 7,680 1:20
512 15,380 1:30
Table 2.1: Comparison of Key Sizes.
2.2.4 Applications of ECC Based Protocols
After 25 years of their existence in cryptography, the factual benefits of using elliptic
curves have finally been realized. ECC is progressively used in public key cryptography
protocols, like for instance for carrying out digital signatures and key agreements. It is
also used in digital signatures, pseudo-random generators, encryption, and for integer
factorization algorithms such as Lenstra elliptic curve factorization (Bos et al., 2014).
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Chapter 3
STATIC VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction to Static Vulnerability Analysis
This section introduces static analysis and explains how it can be practiced to expose
security vulnerabilities. Static analysis assesses application software without running
it. This holds in contrast to dynamic analysis which executes the code and examine
its runtime nature. Conventional approach used in static analysis consists of data flow
analysis and model checking. Data flow analysis was introduced by Gary A. Kildall (Kil-
dall, 1973), analyzes each sentence in a code to generate a set of information related to
that sentence. The information may be values, variable names, or mathematical expres-
sions, depending on the target of definitive analysis (Kildall, 1973). In this work, static
vulnerability analysis of various ECC based authentication and key exchange protocols
was performed, and possible vulnerabilities were highlighted using data flow analysis (a
static vulnerability analysis techique).
The static vulnerability testing in this work followed a three step approach:
1. A threat model was first formulated in which the assumptions were articulated
and the threats under investigation were identified.
2. The actual threat (vulnerability) analysis was performed on the protocols to find
whether they were indeed vulnerable to the threats.
3. Solutions to make the protocols secure against the threats were identified, and
were then applied to the protocols to test whether they made the protocols secure
– 10 –
against the identified threats.
3.2 Analysis of ECC Based Protocols
The first step in the analysis of ECC based protocols which we consider in this thesis is
to design a threat model. Threat modeling is a method for evaluating the security of a
software application. It looks at a system from a possible attacker’s mindset. As shown
in Fig. 3.1, to construct a threat model, it is necessary to specify the assumptions under
which the protocols will be analyzed to identify threats (vulnerabilities) in them. The
threat model also contains the various threats that pose security risks to the protocol.
Figure 3.1: Threat Model
The next step (Fig. 3.2) is to choose authentication protocols to perform static crypt-
analysis. This work focused solely on protocols that use ECC. Some of the other criteria
used for selecting protocols include:
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1. Protocol recency.
2. Variation in usage of authentication factors (e.g. smart cards, RFIDs, memory
drives, etc.).
3. Variation in techniques to implement security (e.g. timestamps, nonce, encryp-
tion, hashes, etc.).
Figure 3.2: The Threat Model Analysis Steps
Threat vulnerability analysis was performed on the protocols identified (discussed in
the next chapter) to find whether they are indeed vulnerable to the threats. The last step
is to suggest solutions to prevent the identified attack in order to make the protocols
more secure.
3.3 Application of the Threat Model to Analyze Protocols
A threat model helps assess the probability, potential harm, and priority of attacks on
a given ECC based protocol, and thus helps minimize threats in the protocols. It is of-
ten useful to define many different threat models for a system (of protocols), with each
– 12 –
model representing a different set of analysis, where each set contains different types
of vulnerabilities. Threat identification is intended to identify potential threats in sys-
tem components, that might lead to a breach in the overall security of a system. The
absence of security against a threat could denote a vulnerability whose risk could be re-
duced with the application of a countermeasure. Threats in protocols are identified by
performing vulnerability analysis and finding flaws in protocol design of the protocol.
Analysis results are used to suggest improvements to the protocol to prevent possible
attacks and make it more secure.
3.4 Adversary Model and Evaluation Criteria
Many papers reviewing smart-card-based password authentication schemes have been
published lately. But, in many of these findings, the publishers demonstrate attacks
over conventional design’s and introduce new protocols along with affirmation of their
exceptional approach of their design’s, while avoiding gain that their design fails to pro-
vide, hence ignoring extensions on which it fares low (Wang et al., 2012). Inspite of the
lack of widespread assessment criteria, one more familiar attribute of these studies is
that there isn’t an appropriate security confirmation, that explains why protocols earlier
believed to be secure show up to be vulnerable (Wang et al., 2012). The research history
of this domain is summarized in Fig 3.3. The history of break and fix has been such that
the new protocol comes into the picture after the existing protocol breaks.
In 1981, Lamport began the research on protocols using single factor authentication
(password). In 1991, Chang Wu continued the research using two-factor authentica-
tion, which is password combined with smart card. This contributed to the growth of
the research tree. The dotted line shows a clear demarcation between the tamper resis-
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tance and non-tamper resistance based protocols which use smart card. The protocols
above the dotted line are established under the presumption which states that the smart
card is tamper resistance and the protocols below the dotted line are established under
the presumption which states that the smart card is non-tamper resistance. Hence, the
protocols which have come into existence after making a practical presumption which
states that the smart card is non-tamper resistance are more secure. The left side of the
research tree displays the ECC. This research is expected to extend this research tree.
Figure 3.3: Research on Security Protocols
In common password authenticated key exchange protocols, the potential adversary is
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assumed to hold total authority of the communication channel such as by eavesdrop-
ping, intercepting and changing any broadcasted messages over the public network. Al-
though this assumption can be considered correct for password-based authentication
protocols, it might be less likely for password-based remote authentication systems that
use smart cards. As investigated by Wang et al., harmful card readers can also deepen
the security breakdown of these schemes (Wang, 2012).
In a real world, past session key(s) and components applied to compose the session key
could be dropped on several grounds (Krawczyk, 2005), varying from a breach in the
software/hardware system to a malicious plan of an insider or the arbitrary release of
the particular session key at the time the session is damaged (Wang, 2012). Computing
this capability to the vulnerability test allows the model to catch the risk of the known
key attack. To examine the break of the server’s long-term private key, the vulnerability
test provides to the attacker the skill of mastering server’s long-time private key. This
method allows us to handle forward secrecy (Wang, 2012). In cryptography, forward
secrecy is a attribute of secure protocols wherein compromise of long-time keys will not
compromise previous session keys. It also saves previous sessions towards oncoming
compromises of secret keys/passwords (Wikipedia, 2016b).
In remote user authentication schemes, a user is usually permitted to select their own
identity accordingly in the registration phase. A user often usually selects an identity
which can be easily remembered for convenience purposes. Therefore, these ID’s are
not so strong and hence can be speculated by an attacker A within polynomial time
(Wang, 2012). Hence, it is fair to assume that A could guess all the (I D,PW ) pairs in
the Cartesian product Did ∗Dpw within polynomial time where PW , Dpw and Did
denote the password, password space and the identity space, respectively. Furthermore,
it is favorable to presume that a decisive attacker may in some way may learn the victim’s
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ID. First, the user’s ID is fixed and usually bound to follow a familiar pattern, also it can
be easily guessed than the password (Bonneau et al., 2010). Second, in convention,
unaware users tend to write down their ID on the card, and the adversary can learn
the personal information of the user when they receive access to the card. Finally, the
input ID is often presented in plain text on the screen’s display and is prone to shoulder-
surfing. As pointed out in (Yang et al., 2006), though the analysis of these schemes have
a old history, no conventional series of attractive security properties were extensively
identified for building such schemes (Wang, 2012).
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Chapter 4
FRAMEWORK FOR CRYPTANALYSIS
In this chapter we will describe each of the protocols, the potential attacks on them, and
the solutions against those attacks.
4.1 General Algorithms and Conditions for Various Attacks
In this section, general algorithms and conditions for the attacks that were successfully
performed on the protocols chosen for this work are described.
4.1.1 Clogging Attack
The technique for almost all password authentication protocols is that the client (of-
ten a smart card reader, memory stick, or RFID) provdes its authorization to the server,
which in turn computes particular arithmetic operations in order to validate the creden-
tials. These protocols often function in multiple phases. The phases in which client and
server authentication take place will be discussed in Chapter 5 after each protocol has
been individually considered.
As shown in Fig. 4.1, the prime concept of the clogging attack is blockage of the message
that contains login credentials between the client and the server (Garrett et al., 2015).
This message is not encrypted in a few protocols, and encrypted in others. It may or may
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Figure 4.1: The Clogging Attack
not contain a timestamp. The attacker replays the intercepted message multiple times
to enforce the server to carry out computationally intensive operations (in the case of
(Khatwani and Roy, 2015), ECC operations), hence enforcing the server to lose its time
and resources. Authorized users are blocked services in this way. Algorithm 1 depicts
this type of attack.
Algorithm 1 The General Algorithm for Clogging Attack. (Garrett et al., 2015)
Intercept login message from client to server
if Timestamp is present then
Change timestamp to suit requirements
else
Keep message as is
end if
while The server is not completely clogged! do
Replay the message to the server
end while
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4.1.2 Application of Algorithm 1
The clogging elements we evaluate in this work rely on the computational and resource
intensiveness of the operations in elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). The widely used
ECC operations by most of the authentication schemes are:
1. Bilinear pairing
2. Scalar multiplication in group G
3. Map-to-point conversion
Let Tp , Ts , and Tmap respectively be the time taken to perform a single bilinear pairing,
scalar multiplication, and map-to-point conversation respectively. It has been shown
in (Xu and Wu, 2015) that:
1. Tp > Ts > Tmap
2. Tp ≈ 3×Ts
3. Tp ≈ 4×Tmap
Further, let Tmodex be the time taken by one modulo exponentiation operation. It has
been proven (Farash and Ahmadian-Attari, 2014) that Tp ≈ 2×Tmodex for the same level
of security. The operation modular exponentiation has been shown to be very compu-
tationally intensive (Garrett et al., 2015). In fact, Tmodex has been shown to be approxi-
mately a hundred times that of normal addition, multiplication, and bitwise XOR opera-
tions. We can, hence, conclude that all the ECC based operations bilinear pairing, scalar
multiplication, and map-to-point conversation are computationally intensive.
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of ECC and Modex Operations
Hence, a protocol that uses ECC operation has a vulnerability to the clogging attack, a
type of DoS in which the attacker abuse the computational intensiveness nature of ECC
operations.
4.1.3 Database Attack
According to many experts, databases are still not secured properly in most organiza-
tions (Higgins, 2008). Database attacks go unnoticed as it takes less than a few seconds
to hack in and out of a database. Therefore, it is not a wonder that a lot database attacks
go undiscovered by large organizations until late after the information has been com-
promised. Attackers use clean methods to cause a breach in databases, such as exploit-
ing weak authentication, using default passwords and exploiting familiar vulnerabilities
(Higgins, 2008).
This analysis focuses on database connections which are weak and hence open to vul-
nerabilities. The front end client-server authentication stores passwords in the server’s
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Figure 4.3: The Database Attack
back-end databases. If any password is compromised, then the database schema be-
comes vulnerable to attack which makes the protocol insecure (as explained in Algo-
rithm 2). Passwords and their hashed forms are usually stored in relational databases.
The most familiar approach to get unauthorized access to a database is to make a copy
of the database by a technique called SQL injection. SQL injection attacks appears
where the fields accessible for user input allow SQL statements through to query the
database instantly. Web applications generally are the weakest link outside of the client’s
architecture (Higgins, 2008).
Internal attacks should also never be underestimated. There have been many cases of
insider attacks which came as a result of a malicious user acquiring more system access
than the user should have had (Higgins, 2008). Databases are usually attainable from
inside organizations and passwords can easily be found in the source code or configu-
ration files. This gives an opportunity to employees to access data and save it to a local
disk or even transfer it to an external output device.
In the following chapters, database attacks to which recently used protocols are vul-
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nerable are considered.
Algorithm 2 The General Algorithm for Database Attack
Intercept data access layer from application to back-end 
if Encryption is present then
Break the encryption to gain access to the database 
else
Access the database
end if
while The data are not corrupted and stolen do
Inject malicious statements
end while
4.1.4 Man in the Middle Attack
Figure 4.4: The Man in the Middle (MITM) Attack
As shown in Fig. 4.4, a man-in-the-middle attack can be used towards some of the cryp-
tographic protocols. A man-in-the-middle attack needs an attacker to gain the capa-
bility to control and inject messages onto a communication medium. One example is
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eavesdropping, wherein the attacker atempts to make separate communications with
the victims and relays messages between them to make them believe they are talking
with each other over a private network, where as in reality the complete conversation is
governed by the attacker. Attacker has the ability to intercept all the messages passing
between the two victims and inject new ones. A few ECC based protocols claim to be
secure against man-in-the-middle attacks. However, ECC protocols are still vulnerable
to man-in-the-middle attacks, as shown in the next chapter.
Algorithm 3 The General Algorithm for Man in the Middle Attack
Intercept communication between two parties
if TTP is present then
Acquires access and potentially alters the communication between two victims who
are bound to believe they are directly communicating with each other
else
Acts as an invader who relays and modifies the message between two victims
end if
while The communication is not ended do
Relay
end while
4.1.5 Application of Algorithm 3
An alternative of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm that uses elliptic curve cryptography,
Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is an anonymous key agreement protocol that
grants two entitites, each holding an elliptic curve public-private key pair, to originate a
shared secret over a not so secure channel (Wikipedia, 2016a) (LaMacchia and Manfer-
delli, 2006), (Bos et al., 2009), (Sherwood et al., 2012). This shared secret can be used as
a key, or it can be used to establish a different key, which may then be used to encrypt fol-
lowing interactions using a symmetric key cipher. The following illustration will show
how a key is originated. For example, Alisa wants to establish a shared key with Rob,
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but the only medium available for both of them can be eavesdropped by a third party.
Firstly, the domain parameters (that is, (p, a,b,G ,n,h) need to be established. Let Al-
isa’s key pair be (dA,QA) and Rob’s key pair be (dB ,QB ). Each party must know the other
party’s public key before the initiation of the protocol.
Alisa computes (xk , yk ) = dAQB . Rob computes (xk , yk ) = dBQA. The shared secret
which is same for both parties is xk (the x coordinate of the computed point). The sole
information about Alisa’s private key that she gives out is her public key. Therefore, no
other party except for Alisa can establish her private key, unless that interested party
has the potential to solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Rob’s private
key is equivalenty secure. Only Alisa and Rob can compute the shared secret (Wikipedia,
2016a).
Authentication is important to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks. If either of Alisa’s or
Rob’s public keys is fixed, then man-in-the-middle attacks are defeated. Fixed public
keys do not provide forward secrecy or key-compromise impersonation resilience, amid
other improvised security measures. (Wikipedia, 2016a).
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Chapter 5
CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOLS
This chapter describes each of the protocols selected for analysis in this work, the at-
tacks on them, and ways of preventing the attacks. Two of the protocols mentioned
in this chapter have also been illustrated in the already published work by the author
(Khatwani and Roy, 2015). The following generic notations have been used to describe
the protocols in this chapter. Specific notations for each individual protocol have been
illustrated while describing each of them:
• Z∗q denotes the finite field over q
• ⊗ denote (bitwise) exclusive OR
• A→B : M denotes the propagation of the message M from user A to user B
• ‖ denotes the concatenation operation
• In cryptography, a nonce is an arbitrary number that may only be used once
5.1 Choice of Protocols
The protocols chosen for analysis fall into the large domain of multi-factor authentica-
tion protocols. All of them employ user ID and password for authentication. Choice
of these protocols is based on differences in the second authentication factor (smart
cards, RFIDs, memory drives, etc .), and the tools used to serve confidentiality (times-
tamp,encryption, nonce, etc.).
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Protocol Type Factor Used Confidentiality
Moosavi Authentication RFID Usage of Random Numbers
Xu Authentication Smart Card Usage of Random Numbers
He Authentication RFID Usage of Random Numbers
Hui Authentication Password Usage of Encryption
Ammayappan Key Exchange – Trusted Third Party
Table 5.1: Summary of the Differences in the Protocols
5.2 Moosavi et al.’s Protocol for RFID Implant Systems
The first protocol considered is that of (Moosavi et al., 2014). This is a mutual authen-
tication scheme for an RFID implant system. (Moosavi et al., 2014) assert that their
protocol is immune to various attacks including denial of service (DoS). But, their proto-
col is inherently vulnerable to clogging attacks (a form of DoS) that apply the algorithm
of (Garrett et al., 2015). Most of the precursor protocols to that of (Moosavi et al., 2014)
are vulnerable to clogging attacks. In this section, the mathematical groundwork that
makes the protocols vulnerable to clogging attack is identified, and a desirable counter-
measure is suggested.
5.2.1 Review of the Protocol
Moosavi et. al’s protocol works in three phases: Reader Authentication and Verification,
Tag Identification and Tag Verification. Figure 5.1 shows the notations used for the pro-
tocol.
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Figure 5.1: Notations for Moosavi et al.’s Protocol (Moosavi et al., 2014)
This protocol allows the two interacting parties, an RFID implant tag and a reader, to
respectively validate and assure both identities. The assumption is that the communi-
cation between the reader and tag is weak (Khatwani and Roy, 2015). The protocol is
shown in Algorithm 4.
5.2.2 Analysis of Moosavi et al.’s Protocol
This protocol is for an RFID implant system that has applications in microchip implant.
The identities are the tag that is implanted, and the reader that verifies (and authenti-
cates) the tag. Communication between the tag and the reader is through an insecure
network. Additionally, the reader is connected to a database through a secured chan-
nel, so the reader and database is considered to be a single entity for analysis purpose
(Khatwani and Roy, 2015). The protocol uses ECC techniques twice, once during tag
identification (step I4 of Algorithm 4) and once during tag verification (step V6 of Algo-
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Algorithm 4 Moosavi et al.’s Protocol for RFID Implant SystemsReader Authentiation and Verifiation
Reader R
1. Step A1. Select a random number r1 ∈ Zn and computes R1 = r1 ·P as its public
key.
2. Step A2. Initialize i1 to 1.
3. Step A3. R→T : {R1, i1}.
4. Step A4. Increment i1 by r1.
Tag T
1. Step A5. Verify if i1 ≥ i2 (i2 is initialized to 0).
2. Step A6. If the above is true, then set i2 to i1.
3. Step A7. Compute r3 = X (r2 ·P )∗Y (R1), where ∗ is a non-algebraic operation
over the abscissa of (r2 ·P ) and the ordinate of R1.
4. Step A8. T→R : {r3}.
Reader R
1. Step A9. Compute R2 = r1 · I D t + r3 · s3.
2. Step A10. R→T : {R2}.
Tag T
1. Step A11. Verify if (R2 − r1 · I D t )r−13 ·P = I Dr .
2. Step A12. Reader R gets verified if the above is true.Tag Identifiation
Reader R
1. Step I1. Select rs ∈ Zn , a random integer.
2. Step I2. R→T : {rs}.
Tag T
1. Step I3. Validate if rs 6= 0. If success, then compute s2 = f (X (s1)) ·P .
2. Step I4. Select a random integer k and calculate curve point (x, y) = k ·G
3. Step I5. Calculate d = x mod n
4. Step I6. Validate if d = 0. If success, recalculate d using a different k.
5. Step I7. Calculate value of ID as I D t = (Mb(X (s1))∗Mb(X (s2))) ·P .
6. Step I8. Calculate c = k · (Hash(I D t )+X (s1)∗d) mod n.
7. Step I9. Validate if c = 0. If yes, recalculate c using a different k.
8. Step I10. T→R : {I D t , (d ,c)}.
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Moosavi et. al.’s scheme (contd.)Tag Verifiation
Reader R
1. Step V1. Select a random integer rs ∈ Zn .
2. Step V2. Compute public key pr = rs ·P .
3. Step V3. Verify if d ,c ∈ Zn.
4. Step V4. If true, compute h = Hash(I D t ).
5. Step V5. Compute w = c−1 mod n, u1 = zw mod n, and u2 = d w mod n re-
spectively.
6. Step V6. Compute curve point (x, y) = u1 ·P +pr .
7. Step V7. Verify if r = x mod n. If true, authenticate tag T .
rithm 4). However, in the course of this work it became clear that the tag verification
phase has a dangling step in Step V6. The use of variable u2 in the verification process
is not mentioned in this protocol. Also, from (Moosavi et al., 2014) the description of
verification variable r of Step V7 is not mentioned in this protocol.
5.2.3 Clogging Attack on Moosavi et al.’s Protocol
During this work, a security analysis of (Moosavi et al., 2014) was performed as in Sec-
tion 5 of their paper (Moosavi et al., 2014). The adversary A has the same power as
assumed by Moosavi et al. A needs to be able to read and modify the contents of mes-
sages over a not so secure medium during the Tag Identification and Tag Verification
phases of the protocol (Khatwani and Roy, 2015). The line of attack in this work is a
denial of service where the aim of A is to damage the whole RFID system. There are
two steps (a map-to-point conversion in Step V6, and a scalar multiplication in Step V2)
where ECC schemes are applied that A can try (Khatwani and Roy, 2015). However, it
might be more profitable to render the Reader R useless, the line of attack selected here
will try breaking the Reader R in a way that it will block services to authentic tags.
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1. A intercepts an authentic message of T→R : {I D t , (d ,c)} from step Step I10.
2. As the message is not encrypted, A can always modify the (d ,c) such that d ,c ∈ Zn
holds (though A might not need to).
3. A simply relays {I D t , (d ,c)} to R .
The following is performed by the Reader R :
1. Step V1. Select a random integer rs ∈ Zn .
2. Step V2. Calculate public key pr = rs ·P .
3. Step V3. Validate if d ,c ∈ Zn.
4. Step V4. If success, calculate h = Hash(I D t ).
5. Step V5. Calculate w = c−1 mod n, u1 = zw mod n, and u2 = d w mod n respec-
tively.
6. Step V6. Calculate curve point (x, y) = u1 ·P +pr .
7. Step V7. Validate if r = x mod n. If success, authenticate tag T .
A would make the reader R re-run steps V1 through V7 to calculate the ECC oper-
ations many times. A has the potential to modify the incoming login requests from
an authorized tag to R . As the ECC operations are computationally intensive (Farash
and Ahmadian-Attari, 2014), the victimized Reader R spends considerable computing
resources performing unwanted ECC computations (a map-to-point conversion in Step
V6, and a scalar multiplication in Step V2) along with the other steps V1, V3 through
V5, and V7 rather than any real work. Thus A clogs R with unwanted work and hence
denies an authorized tag (user) any service. A needs only an ID of a single authentic
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tag to implement the clogging attack (Khatwani and Roy, 2015). It should be noted that
even DoS-resilient mechanisms are introduced on Reader R’s side, it might be not a real
obstruction for the attacker A as it can initialize new sessions with various identities in
an interleaving pattern. Therefore, A may possibly implement the above attack proce-
dure continuously. If distributed DoS attacks are implemented based on this strategy,
the effect of it will be more serious (Khatwani and Roy, 2015).
5.2.4 Proposed Countermeasures from the Attack
In the early stages of the authentication phase, the reader may validate to see if the net-
work address of the tag is authentic. It has to learn the network addresses of all the
registered authentic tags. A could still deceit the network address of a authentic tag
and replay the tag verification message. To prevent this deceit, a cookie exchange step
may be inserted at the beginning of the tag verification phase of Moosavi et al.’s pro-
tocol (Khatwani and Roy, 2015). This step has been constructed as in the well known
Oakley key exchange protocol (Orman, 1998).
1. The Tag T selects a pseudo-random number n1 and sends it along with the mes-
sage {I D t , (d ,c)}.
2. The Reader R upon receiving the message, acknowledges the message and sends
its own cookie n2 to T .
3. The next message from T must contain n2, else T rejects the message and the Tag
Verification request.
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5.2.4.1 Security Analysis of the Fix
Had A spoofed T ’s IP address, A would not get n2 back from R . Therefore A succeeds
only in having R send back an acknowledgement, but not in launching the computation-
ally intensive ECC based operations. Therefore the clogging attack is negated by these
extra steps. It must be noted, though, that this process does not avoid the clogging at-
tack but only resists it to some extent. This fix will completely work only if n1, and n2 are
encrypted respectively by T ’s and R’s private keys for a secure communication (Khat-
wani and Roy, 2015).
5.3 Xu et al.’s Smart Card Based Protocol
The next protocol we look at in this work is due to Xu et al. (Xu and Wu, 2015). It is
an ECC based remote authentication protocol involving smart cards. Xu et al.’s proto-
col in (Xu and Wu, 2015) is an advancement over its predecessor, Li et al.’s protocol (Li,
2013), which (Xu and Wu, 2015) claimed to be vulnerable towards the off-line password
guessing, user impersonation, and the denial of service (DoS) attacks. (Xu and Wu,
2015) introduced a new protocol, which they prove is immune against all three attacks.
We briefly present Xu et al.’s protocol. We then demonstrate a clogging attack on the pro-
tocol. Many protocols cited in their paper (Xu and Wu, 2015) are found to be vulnerable
to clogging attack. We then suggest a suitable countermeasure towards clogging attack
for this protocol (Khatwani and Roy, 2015).
5.3.1 Review of the Protocol
Xu et al.’s protocol works in five phases: Registration, Authentication, Password Change,
Card Revocation, and User Eviction. Figure 5.2 shows the notations used for the proto-
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col.
Figure 5.2: Notations for Xu et al.’s Protocol (Xu and Wu, 2015)
We present the Registration, Authentication phases of the protocol in Algorithm 5. The
other phases are omitted as those are not needed to present the clogging attack (Khat-
wani and Roy, 2015).
– 33 –
Algorithm 5 Xu et. al.’s Scheme of AuthenticationRegistration Phase
User Ui
1. Step R1. Select identity I Di , password PWi .
2. Step R2. Select ri
3. Step R3. Calculate HPWi = h0(PWi ∥ ri )
4. Step R4. Ui→S: {I Di , HPWi } through a secure channel.
Server S
1. Step R5. Validate I Di , select N
2. Step R6. Calculate ki = h0(Xs ∥ I Di ∥ N ) and Wi = ki ⊕HPWi .
3. Step R7. Store {Wi ,P ,Ppub } into smart card.
4. Step R8. Store {I Di , N } in the server’s database.
5. Step R9. S→Ui : The smart card.
User Ui
1. Step R10. Upon receiving the smart card from S, Ui enters stores ri in it.Authentiation
User Ui
1. Step A1. Ui inserts his smart card and inputs I Di , and PWi .
2. Step A2. Smart card chooses random ru ∈ Z∗n .
3. Step A3. Compute HPWi = h0(PWi ∥ ri )
4. Step A4. Compute R1 = ru ×P = (R1x ,R1y ), R2 = ru ×Ppub = (R2x ,R2y ).
5. Step A5. Compute B1 = h0((Wi ⊕HPWi ) ∥ h0(R1x ∥R2x ∥R1y ∥ R2y )).
6. Step A6. Compute C I Di = I Di ⊕h0(R2x ∥ R2y ).
7. Step A7. Ui→S: {C I Di ,B1,R1}.
Server S
1. Step A8. Compute R ′2 = Xs×R1, I D
′
i
=C I Di⊕h0(R ′2x ∥ R
′
2y ), ki = h0(Xs ∥ I D
′
i
∥ N ).
2. Step A9. Verify if B1 = h0(ki ∥ h0(R1x ∥ R ′2x ∥ R1y ∥ R
′
2y )). Abort if not true, con-
tinue if true.
3. Step A10. Choose random rs ∈ Z∗n .
4. Step A11. Compute R3 = rs ×P = (R3x ,R3y ), Ks = rs ×R1 = (Ksx ,Ks y ).
5. Step A12. Compute B2 = h0(ki ∥ h0(R ′2x ∥ R
′
2y )).
6. Step A13. Compute B3 = h1(R1x ∥ R1y ∥ R3x ∥ R3y ∥ I Di ∥ S ∥ B2 ∥ Ksx ∥ Ks y ).
7. Step A14. Compute session key sks = h2(R1x ∥ R1y ∥ R3x ∥ R3y ∥ S ∥ I Di ∥ B2 ∥
Ksx ∥ Ks y ).
8. Step A15. S→Ui : {R3,B3}.
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Xu et. al.’s scheme (contd.)
User Ui
1. Step A16. Compute Ku = ru × R3 = (Kux ,Kuy ) and B ′2 = h0((Wi ⊕ HPWi ) ∥
h0(R2x ∥ R2y )).
2. Step A17. Verify if B ′3 = h1(R1x ∥ R1y ∥ R3x ∥ R3y ∥ I Di ∥ S ∥ B2 ∥ Kux ∥ Kuy ).
Abort if not true, continue if true.
3. Step A18. Compute session key sks = h2(R1x ∥ R1y ∥ R3x ∥ R3y ∥ S ∥ I Di ∥ B2 ∥
Kux ∥ Kuy ).
5.3.2 Clogging Attack on Xu et al.’s Protocol
The adversary A has the same power as assumed by Xu et al’s (Xu and Wu, 2015) while
exposing the flaws of Li et. al’s protocol (Li, 2013). A needs to be able to read and modify
the contents of messages over an insecure channel during the Authentication phase of
the protocol (Khatwani and Roy, 2015).
1. A intercepts a valid login request ({C I Di ,B1,R1}) from step Step A7.
2. A simply replays this login message to S.
Lemma 5.3.1. The server S is bound to perform steps A8 through A15 if {C I Di ,B1,R1} is
valid.
Proof. The only step that could prevent the server S from executing further steps is Step
A9. We claim B1 = h0(ki ∥ h0(R1x ∥ R ′2x ∥ R1y ∥ R
′
2y )) would always be true if B1 and R1
are legit. To verify our claim we note B1 = h0((Wi ⊕ HPWi ) ∥ h0(R1x ∥ R2x ∥ R1y ∥ R2y )).
Plugging in the value of Wi = ki ⊕HPWi , we have B1 = h0(ki ∥ h0(R1x ∥ R2x ∥ R1y ∥ R2y )).
Now, R1 = ru ×P = (R1x ,R1y ), R2 = ru ×Ppub = (R2x ,R2y ) and R
′
2 = Xs ×R1. Therefore,
if we have a valid B1 and R1, the values of R2 and R ′2 always match, which verifies the
claim.
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The adversary A replays the message {C I Di ,B1,R1} many times and utilizes the server S
compute steps A8 through A15 (by Lemma 5.3.1). The steps contain several scalar mul-
tiplications, and map-to-point conversations. A could probably save all the incoming
login request messages from an authorized user to S for future replay. As the mathemat-
ical operations in the steps are computationally intensive, the victimized server spends
ample computing resources performing worthless calculations. Thus A clogs S with
useless work and hence rejects any legitimate user any service. A needs only one mes-
sage from a single authentic user to perform the clogging attack repeatedly (Khatwani
and Roy, 2015).
However, as (Xu and Wu, 2015) noted, the attacker A will not get a authorized access by
this replay attack. As ru will differ every time, the validation B ′2 = h0((Wi ⊕ HPWi ) ∥
h0(R2x ∥ R2y )) at the user’s side would fail. However, the objective of A here is not
to attain unauthorized access, but to crash the server by implementing a clogging at-
tack (Khatwani and Roy, 2015).
5.3.2.1 Clogging Attack Performed on Other Similar Schemes
The clogging attack performed on (Xu and Wu, 2015) can also be performed on Li’s pro-
tocol (Li, 2013). The clogging attack on Li’s protocol is more effective because Li’s proto-
col (Li, 2013) utilizes the utmost computationally intensive bilinear pairing operation.
The protocols by (Xu and Wu, 2015) and (Li, 2013) are vulnerable as the user’s smart card
does not encrypt the message it sends to the server for login and authentication. Thus
the attacker has the opportunity to change the context of message.
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5.3.2.2 Proposed Countermeasures from Clogging Attack
Replay attacks on utmost smart card based protocols are possible as their security heav-
ily depend on computationally intensive operations (in this case ECC), and by default
the messages are unencrypted. This vulnerability is usually unnoticed, as the common
result of a replay is not a DoS. An approach to minimizing these attacks on Xu and Wu’s
protocol (and smart card based protocols in general) would be
1. Ui uses a time stamp T in Step A7, and S validates it in Step A8. The time stamp
should also be encrypted in a manner such that A cannot tamper with it.
2. S validates if multiple login requests regularly directs from the same user. This
minimizes the opportunities of a reply.
The chances of a replay are minimized but not eliminated as A can gain many authen-
tic user IDs and send invalid login requests repeatedly from various IDs. Alternatively,
A can save different (authentic) login requests over a period of time, and replay them
repeatedly (Khatwani and Roy, 2015).
Another way to avoid clogging attack: The mathematical basis of the protocols’ vulner-
ability to clogging attacks is modular exponentiation. An approach to altogether by-
pass clogging attacks would be to encrypt all the messages between Ui and S. Carrying
out would call for a key exchange step, where every user has a private key and a public
key (Khatwani and Roy, 2015). The server learns the public key, and can decrypt a mes-
sage encrypted by a user’s private key. Hence the server makes sure that the message is
from a authentic user before it computes the expensive ECC operations. This approach
comes with a cost and is based on the layer of security desired. This countermeasure
works for all protocols (whether or not they are smart card based) (Khatwani and Roy,
2015).
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5.3.3 Weak Authentication and SQL Injection Attack
The proposed scheme in this paper does not mention how the ID and N are stored in
the account table during the registration phase. This paper does not mention if an en-
cryption is present at the database level. Under the assumption that the account table
is accessible to an untrusted source, ID and N can be dynamically constructed in the
query thus leading to a SQL injection attack. Also, under the assumption that ID and
N are unprotected, weak authentication attack is possible as well. These attacks lead to
loss in confidentiality, authentication, authorization and integrity. Hence, we conclude
that the database layer authentication is not strong enough to protect unknown users
from gaining access to the database.
5.3.3.1 Proposed Security Countermeasures for Weak Authentication Attack
SQL Injection attacks can be overcome by parsing and authenticating SQL communi-
cations to ensure they are not corrupted. If the protocol shows how the ID and N are
stored and protected in a table, then the attack will be minimized. The weak authenti-
cation attack can be protected by adding more access layers and by enforcing strict user
privileges.
5.3.4 Unauthorized Access Attack
In (Xu and Wu, 2015), sections 4.4 card revocation and 4.5 user eviction talk about a
smart card being stolen and verified after being stolen. This can lead to a potential
risk. If the smart card is seized by the attacker, the user ID and the password will be
accessible to the attacker. The attacker can enter malicious input and potentially hack
the database server. Under the assumption, that the smart card re-registration phase
is unprotected, unauthorized access attack is possible on this protocol. For example,
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an unauthorized client can steal the smart card or eavesdrop on the data exchanged
between an authorized client and server. This critical information such as user ID and
password can be used to cause other major attacks.
5.3.4.1 Proposed Security Countermeasures Against Unauthorized Access Attack
To counter unauthorized access, card revocation should be handled by more efficient al-
gorithms. Validation methods, access control mechanisms and password policies granted
by the server provide accomplished ways of avoiding unauthorized access. A network
firewall, consisting of a software program, hardware device, or a consolidation of the
two, safeguards an internal network against harmful access from the outside. Network
firewalls can also be contructed to block access from internal users to the outside.
5.4 He et al.’s RFID Based Authentication Protocol
The next protocol considered in this work is due to (He et al., 2014). This is an RFID
based authentication protocol to sustain identity privacy. He et al.’s protocol is an im-
provement over (Liao and Hsiao, 2014), which claimed to be vulnerable towards insider,
and impersonation attacks. We briefly show the protocol in Algorithm 6. Figure 5.3
shows the notations used for the protocol. This protocol has been claimed to be re-
sistant from different attacks (He et al., 2014). We demonstrate a clogging attack on the
protocol and notice that it is inherently vulnerable to clogging, weak authentication and
SQL injection attacks. The proposed ECC-based RFID authentication scheme consists
of two phases, i.e., the setup phase and the authentication. We present the protocol in
Algorithm 6.
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Figure 5.3: Notations for He et al.’s Protocol (He et al., 2014).
5.4.1 Clogging Attack on He.et.al’s Protocol
The adversary A has an equal power as supposed by (He et al., 2014) while showing the
flaws of Liao’s protocol (Liao and Hsiao, 2014). A needs only to be able to read and
modify the contexts of messages over an insecure channel while in the authentication
phase. Steps taken by A to execute the clogging attack are as follows:
• A intercepts a authentic login request m2 = R2, AuthT from step Step A4.
• As the message is not encrypted, A changes AuthT to a arbitrary garbage value
AuthA .
• A then sends {R2, AuthA } to the server S.
The following steps are carried out by the server S:
1. The server S calculates T KS1 = XSR2, T KS2 = r1R2, and X ′T = (AuthA⊕T KS2)−
T KS1.
2. The server search its database for X ′T . It is not found, and therefore the server
terminates the session.
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Algorithm 6 He et al.’s Scheme Set Up Phase
1. Step S1. The server S chooses a random number xS ∈ Z∗n such that PS = xS P .
2. Step S2. The server S chooses a random point XT on the elliptic curve E for each
tag.
3. Step S3. S stores the ID-verifier XT and parameters into the tag’s memory. The
server also keeps xS as its private key, and stores XT into its database.Authentiation Phase
Server S
1. Step A1. Choose a random number r1 ∈ Z∗n then computes R1 = r1P .
2. Step A2. S→T : m1 = R1.
Tag T
1. Step A3. Choose a new random number r2 ∈ Z∗n then calculates R2 = r2P , T KT 1 =
r2PS , T KT 2 = r2R1, and AuthT = (XT +T KT 1)⊕T KT 2.
2. Step A4. T→S: m2 = R2, AuthT .
Server S
1. Step A5. The server S calculates T KS1 = XSR2, T KS2 = r1R2, and XT = (AuthT ⊕
T KS2)−T KS1.
2. Step A6.The server search its database for XT . If not located, the server ter-
minates the session. Otherwise, the server calculates AuthS = (XT + 2T KS1)⊕
(2T KS2).
3. Step A7. S→T : m3= {AuthS}.
Tag T
1. Step A8. The tag checks whether (XT +2T KT 1)⊕ (2T KT 2) and AuthS are same.
If they are different, the tag terminates the session, else, the server is authenti-
cated.
A would now play over the steps many times and cause the server S calculate the elliptic
curve operations several times in Steps A5 and A6. A can possibly modify the incoming
requests from an authorized Tag to S. Thus, A clogs S with worthless task (ECC opera-
tions) and hence denies an authorized user any service. A only requires the value of XT
of one authorized user to perform the clogging attack constantly.
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5.4.1.1 Proposed Countermeasures for Clogging Attack
One reason for the vulnerability of this protocol is that the messages m1, m2, m3 are
not encrypted; if the adversary gains access to the message m2, then repeated trans-
mission of this message can clog the server. Also, the timestamp checking is not used
between the tag and the server. Although, random numbers are generated in every step
and used for real time calculation, when messages are not encrypted and timestamps
are not used, the messages are open to the adversary to modify and replay. The solution
could be to add a timestamp Ti to Ri or to m2. The server can validate the authenticity
of the timestamp before it performs the elliptic curve operations.
5.4.2 Weak Authentication Attack
(He et al., 2014) paper does not mention how XT (ID identifier) is stored in the database.
Weak authentication schemas grant attackers to acquire the identity of authorized database
users. Attack schemes include social engineering, brute force attacks, etc (Higgins,
2008). Under the assumption, that XT is unprotected, the adversary can gain access to
XT resulting in illegitimate data access, data availability or corruption. Hence, weak au-
thentication attack is possible assuming the database layer authentication is not strong
enough to protect unknown users from gaining access to the database.
5.4.2.1 Proposed Security Countermeasures for Weak Authentication Attack
To prevent weak authentication attack, enforcement of two-factor authentication or
password is a must (Higgins, 2008). Had the protocol (He et al., 2014) included se-
curity and protection for XT , the weak authentication attack could have been avoided.
Weak authentication attack can also be prevented by adding more access layers and by
enforcing stricter user privileges.
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5.4.3 Desynchronization Attack
A desynchronization attack is a typical RFID related threat in which a tag’s key stored
in the back-end tables and the tag’s memory would be different, because an attacker
blocks the communication between the parties. (He et al., 2014) paper mentions that
XT is not performed (XT is an ID identifier). Their paper claims that the proposed
scheme provides scalability, availability and DoS resistance by not updating XT . To pro-
vide privacy protection, many RFID authentication schemes refresh the tag’s secret in-
formation, in the back-end tables and in the tag, after a successful protocol run. Hence,
integration of private information between the database and the tag is important for
consecutive validations. The most serious threat to which an RFID tag is vulnerable to
is the desynchronization attack. During the past years, RFID (Radio Frequency Identifi-
cation) technology became ubiquitous as they are low cost, it is used in every field and
hence this vulnerability raises a threat in the area of data protection.
5.4.3.1 Proposed Security Countermeasures for Desynchronization Attack
One of the countermeasures is offcourse to update the XT after each run. It is an in-
tractable task to design the lightweight RFID authentication protocol, because the se-
curity engineer must deal with the establishment amid cost, performance and security.
In the future, security engineers can be made aware of the trade offs so as to build an
efficient protocol.
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5.5 Hui et al.’s Protocol
The next protocol in consideration is due to Hui et al. (Shao-hui et al., 2012). In that pa-
per, after pointing out the weakness of the password change phase of Islam et al. (Islam
and Biswas, 2013) and after evaluation several other password authentication schemes,
(Shao-hui et al., 2012) have demonstrated a new password-based authentication and
update scheme using ECC and showed that it can withstand different attacks. But, in
this work the protocol is shown to be primarily susceptible to clogging, weak authenti-
cation and SQL injection attacks.
5.5.1 Review of the Protocol
Hui et al.’s protocol works in four stages: registration phase, password authentication
phase, session key distribution phase and password change phase. We present the pro-
tocol in Algorithm 7. Figure 5.4 shows the notations used for the protocol.
Figure 5.4: Notations for Hui et al.’s Protocol (Shao-hui et al., 2012)
The final two phases are omitted since they are insignificant to the clogging attack demon-
stration. The protocol claims to be immune against replay attacks; however, we find that
it is vulnerable against other attacks as well.
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Algorithm 7 Hui et al.’s Scheme Registration Phase
Client C
1. Step C1. Client C chooses identity I DC , pwC .
2. Step C2. UC = pwC ·P .
3. Step C3. Client C sends I DC and UC to the server S.
Server S
1. Step C4. Server S stores I DC and UC in a write protected file.Password Authentiation Phase
Client C
1. Step C5. Enter I DC , pwC .
2. Step C6. Choose random number rC ∈ Z
∗
n .
3. Step C7. Compute WC = rC ·pWC ·US , RC = rC ·UC = (kx ,ky ), YC = rC ·P .
4. Step C8. Compute M1 = Ekx (I DC ,YC ).
5. Step C9. Client C sends message (I DC ,WC , M1) to server S.
Server S
1. Step C10. Upon receiving the messages, compute R ′C =WA ·d
−1
s = (k
′
x ,k
′
y ).
2. Step C11. Check if I D ′C = I DC , e(Y
′
C ,UC ) = e(R
′
C ,P ) hold. If the equations do
not hold, then stop the session.
3. Step C12. Choose rs ∈ Z∗q .
4. Step C13. Server S sends message M2 = R ′C +WS , M3 = H(WS ) to Client C .
Client A
1. Step C14. Compute W ′S = M2 −RC .
2. Step C15. Check if H(W ′S) = M3 holds. If yes, calculate M4 = H(R
′
C ,W
′
S) and
send it to Server S, else abort.
5.5.2 Clogging Attack on Hui et al.’s Protocol
As before, we essentially need attacker A to be able to read and modify the contexts of
messages over an not so secure channel.
• A intercepts a authentic login request (I DC ,WC , M1) from Step C9
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• Since the message is unencrypted, A changes I DC to I DB
• A then sends (I DB ,WC , M1) to the server S
The server S carry out steps C10 through C15 since the ID matches. A would now rerun
the steps many times and cause the server S calculate the intensive elliptic curve bilin-
ear mapping function of Step C11 and collision-resistant hash function of Step C13, C15
many times. Hence, as in the earlier case, the server gets clogged performing useless
calculations.
5.5.2.1 Proposed Security Countermeasures against Clogging Attack
The vulnerability of the mentioned protocol arises as the message (I DC ,WC , M1) is not
encrypted and the timestamp is not used. The protocol can be strengthened by using
strong encryption of the messages M1, M2 and M3. Also, adding timestamp to the mes-
sages at the time of run will ensure privacy and thus prevent replay attacks which leads
to clogging.
5.5.3 Unauthorized Access Attack
Unauthorised access is the method of attaining access to a resource, network, system or
any other application without approval. Unauthorised access might occur if a user tries
to access a domain which they are not allowed to access. Unauthorised access may also
be a result of unchanged default policies or absence of prescribed access policy docu-
mentation (Telelink, 2016). In the paper, (Shao-hui et al., 2012), I DC and UC are stored
in a write protected file in the step C 4 of the registration phase. Their paper (Shao-hui
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et al., 2012) does not mention how the file is stored and also if it is protected using stan-
dard security measures. Under the assumption, that the I DC and UC are unprotected,
an unauthorized client could potentially steal the write protected file or eavesdrop on
the data interchanged between an authorized client and the directory server. When the
file containing the ID and password becomes accessible to an unauthorized user, the
protocol is compromised under this attack.
5.5.3.1 Proposed Security Countermeasures Against Unauthorized Access Attack
Unauthorized access can occur from outside if the organization is connected to an ex-
tranet or internet or, from inside the organization. The server directory provides expe-
rienced ways of preventing illegitimate access. Some of the methods include utilizing
authentication methods, access control mechanisms and password policies. A network
firewall safeguards an internal network against harmful access from the outside. Net-
work firewalls can also be contructed to block access from internal users to the out-
side (Telelink, 2016).
5.5.4 Unauthorized Tampering Attack
Tampering is the unauthorized modification of data by an unauthorized user. When
an unauthorized user gains access to the write protected file in which I DC and UC are
stored or if they block communication between client and a server, they have the means
to change the server data. These illegitimate modifications may contain:
• Illegitimate modification of data
• Illegitimate change of configuration data
• Alter or cancellation of client’s request to the server
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• Alteration of the server’s response to the client
Adversary A can cause all other kinds of attacks if the write protected file is accessible
to them as it contains all the user identity’s and passwords.
5.5.4.1 Proposed Security Countermeasures Against Unauthorized Tampering Attack
An adversary A may modify a client’s request to the server, deny the request, or modify
the server’s response to the client. The countermeasures include using Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) protocol to solve this issue by authorizing information at either end of the
established connection. Another solution could be to store the I D A and UA in the cloud
instead of a physical device.
5.6 Ammayappan et al. Protocol
The final protocol considered in this work is that of Ammayappan et al. (Ammayappan
et al., 2011). This is a key agreement protocol and works in a mobile ad hoc networks
(MANET) based domain. Ammayappan et al. show their protocol to be immune to man
in the middle (MITM) attack. They claim that the protocol’s security is based on the ECC
logarithm.
5.6.1 Review of the Protocol
The protocol by (Ammayappan et al., 2011)) works in two phases: registration phase and
active phase. Figure 5.5 shows the notations used for the protocol.
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Figure 5.5: Notations for Ammayappan et al.’s Protocol (Ammayappan et al., 2011)
This protocol uses trusted third party (TTP) as a certifying authority. The protocol is
presented in Algorithm 8.
5.6.2 Man in the Middle Attack (MITM) on the Protocol
The adversary E has an equal power as supposed by Ammayappan et al. in (Ammayap-
pan et al., 2011) while conducting the security analysis of the protocol. E is allowed to
read and change contexts of messages over a not so secure medium (in the active phase
of this protocol). The line of our attack is a man in the middle (MITM) attack where the
objective of E would be to impersonate one party (e.g. A) while communicating with
the other (e.g. B). E is allowed to read and change contexts of messages over a not so
secure medium in the active phase of this protocol. Ammayappan et al. claim that their
protocol ensures security through the elliptic curve discrete logarithm. However, the
protocol may be compromised even with ECC being used in the protocol as a security
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Algorithm 8 Ammayappan et al.’s Scheme
Node A
1. Step A1. Select a random number r A and computes QA = r AÂůP as its public
key.
2. Step A2. Node A sends AReq(TokenA,RNA,QA) to Node B .
Node B
1. Step B1. Validate TokenA.
2. Step B2. Generate a random nonce RNB .
3. Step B3. Select a random integer rB and compute QB = rB ·P .
4. Step B4. Compute SKB A = H((rB + b) · (QA + PubA)‖I D A‖I DB‖RNA‖RNB ),
H M ACB = H(SKB A‖H((QA ·x +QB ·x)‖(QA · y +QB · y)‖I D A‖I DB‖RNA‖RNB ).
5. Step B5. Construct message m = RNA‖RNB‖QB‖H M ACB .
6. Step B6. Generate Si gB (m) = (r , s).
7. Step B7. Send Ar ep(m,Si gB (m)) to Node A.
Node A
1. Step A3. Verify B ’s signature Si gB (m).
2. Step A4. Verify received RNA with previous RNA, if no match then
3. Step A5. Compute SK AB = H((r A + a) · (QB + PubB )‖I D A‖I DB‖RNA‖RNB ),
H M AC A = H(SK AB‖H((QA ·x +QB ·x)‖(QA · y +QB · y)‖I D A‖I DB‖RNA‖RNB ).
4. Step A6. Compare computed H M AC A with received H M ACB for integrity
check.
5. Step A7. Send an acknowledgement Si g A(RNB‖H M ACB ) to B .
measure.
5.6.2.1 Proposed Countermeasures for Man in the Middle Attack
The vulnerability in the mentioned protocol lies from the basis that the mechanism of
public key distribution is not mentioned in it, e.g. how node A receives the public key
(PubB ) of node B is not mentioned. The attack in Algorithm 9 succeeds if the attacker
E manages to make A believe that PubE is the public key of B . The countermeasure to
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Algorithm 9 Ammayappan et al.’s Scheme under MITM Attack
Node A
1. Step A1. Select a random number r A and computes QA = r AÂůP as its public
key.
2. Step A2. Node A sends AReq(TokenA,RNA,QA) to Node B .
Adversary E
1. Step E1. Modify the message to AReq(TokenA,RNE ,QE ) and sends to Node B .
Node B
1. Step B1. Compute SKBE = H((rB + b) · (QE + PubE )‖I DE‖I DB‖RNE‖RNB ),
H M ACB = H(SKBE‖H((QE ·x +QB ·x)‖(QE · y +QB · y)‖I DE‖I DB‖RNE‖RNB ).
2. Step B2. Construct message m1 = RNE‖RNB‖QB‖H M ACB .
3. Step B3. Generate Si gB (m1) = (r , s).
4. Step B4. Send Ar ep(m1,Si gB (m1)) to Node A.
Adversary E
1. Step E2. Intercept Ar ep(m1,Si gB (m1)) sent by B (to A).
2. Step E3. Compute SK AE = H((rE + e) · (QA + PubA)‖I D A‖I DE‖RNA‖RNE ),
H M ACE = H(SK AE‖H((QA ·x +QE ·x)‖(QA · y +QE · y)‖I D A‖I DE‖RNA‖RNE )
3. Step E4. Construct message m2 = RNA||RNE ||QE ||H M ACE
4. Step E5. Generate Si gE (m2) = (r , s).
5. Step E6. Send Ar ep(m2,Si gE (m2)) to Node A.
Node B
1. Step B5. Compute SKBE = H((rE + e).(QB + PubB )‖I DE‖I DB‖RNE‖RNB ),
H M ACE = H(SKBE‖H((QE ·x +QB ·x)‖(QE · y +QB · y)‖I DE‖I DB‖RNE‖RNB ).
Node A
1. Step A3. Compute SK AE = H((r A + a) · (QE + PubE )‖I D A‖I DE‖RNA‖RNE ),
H M AC A = H(SK AE‖H((QA ·x +QE ·x)‖(QA · y +QE · y)‖I D A‖I DE‖RNA‖RNE ).
this attack is to use an integrity check in the messages sent from the TTP to nodes. The
following steps may be used to securely distribute (public) keys by the TTP. It is assumed,
the TTP has a database storing public keys of all users.
1. When node A wants to communicate to B , it sends the following message to the
TTP: A ⇒ T T P : Si g A(B‖TA), where TA is the current timestamp of A’s system.
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2. TTP upon receipt of the message, validates the timestamp.
3. TTP then sends the public key of B to A using the following message: T T P ⇒ A :
Si gT T P (PubB‖TT T P‖H(S)), where TT T P is the current timestamp of T T P ’s sys-
tem, and S is a secret value shared between A and the T T P .
4. Upon receipt of the message A validates the timestamp, recomputes H(S), using
the hash and the secret value, and verifies it with the received H(S).
5.6.2.2 Security Analysis of the Fix
As mentioned before, the intention of the attacker E , would be to somehow send its
own public key PubE to A, making A believe it has the public key of B . To achieve this,
E could do either of the following:
1. • Change A’s request to the T T P to Si g A(E‖TA).
• Therefore have the T T P sends back Si gT T P (PubE‖TT T P‖H(S)) to A.
2. Try to change the message Si gT T P(PubB‖TT T P‖H(S)) to Si gT T P (PubE‖TT T P‖H(S)).
E would not be able to do the first because, E would be unaware of the private key of A
needed to create a authentic (duplicate) signature of A. The timestamp provides protec-
tion against a possible replay of an old message by E . For the second, since E does not
know the secret value S, it will not be able to modify the message.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 Summary of Results
In order to determine the vulnerabilities of the five protocols considered, the author
designed generalized cryptanalysis algorithms to perform man in the middle (MITM),
database, and clogging attacks on protocols that use ECC as a security measure. First,
the protocols of Moosavi et al.(2014), Xu and Wu (2015), He et al. (2014) and Hui et
al.(2012) were shown to be vulnerable to clogging attacks. The vulnerability rests in the
use of ECC operations by the server in the validation phase. In this analysis, it was ob-
served that a composition of timestamp, encryption, and a nonce will avoid clogging
attack vulnerability in these three protocols. These protocols were also shown to be
vulnerable to database attacks such as weak authentication, SQL injection, desynchro-
nization, unauthorized access, unauthorized tampering and database protocol vulner-
ability. In this analysis, it was observed that using input validation, an updated ID pro-
cess, a network firewall and encryption would prevent database attack vulnerability in
these protocols. The key agreement protocol by Ammayappan et al. (2011) was next
analyzed. Ammayappan et al. showed their protocol to be immune to MITM attack and
they claimed that the protocol’s security is based on the ECC algorithm. However, in this
work their protocol was shown to be inherently vulnerable to MITM attack.
Table 6.1 summarizes the vulnerabilities found in the protocols analyzed. A Yes in a cell
indicates we found the designated protocol vulnerable to the designated attack through
a static analysis, and a No means that no vulnerability was found. It is evident that many
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of the protocols are vulnerable to clogging and database attacks.
Protocol Clogging MITM Weak
Au-
thenti-
cation
SQL
Injec-
tion
Unauth.
access
DB
vul-
nera-
bility
Desynch Unauth.
tam-
pering
Moosavi
et al.
Yes No No No No No No No
Xu et al. Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No
He et al. Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No
Hui et
al.
Yes No No No Yes No No Yes
Ammaya
et al.
No Yes No No No No No No
Table 6.1: Summary of the Vulnerabilities
The countermeasures are also summarized in Table 6.2. It must be emphasized that as
everything is associated with costs, the amount of security needed will determine the
nature of counter-measure.
6.2 Conclusion
In this thesis, clogging attacks and database attacks have been demonstrated on five re-
cent ECC based authentication schemes. The goal was to bring to light the intricacies
and challenges in designing such protocols. ECC schemes guarantee a high level of se-
curity . However, they could still contain an easily-exploitable vulnerability if they are
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Protocol Mode of Attack Countermeasure
Moosavi et al. Classical Clogging Validity Checks
Xu et al. Classical Clogging, Weak Au-
thentication, SQL Injection,
Unauthorized Access
Efficient Algorithm, input
validation, Timestamp
He et al. Classical Clogging, Weak Au-
thentication, Database Pro-
tocol Vulnerability, Desyn-
chronization
Input Validation, Updat-
ing of ID, Encryption,
Timestamp
Hui et al. Classical Clogging, Unautho-
rized Access, Unauthorized
Tampering
Usage of SSL, Timestamp,
Network firewalls
Ammayappan et al. Man in the Middle Securing Public Key Man-
agement
Table 6.2: Summary of the Results
applied without an additional level of protection. Hence, a layer of protection need to
be added to assure complete security towards clogging attacks.
It is concluded that ECC assures a level of security, however it may create a vulnerabil-
ity if it happens to be applied without an extra layer of protection. Many multi-factor
authentication and key exchange protocols, whether smart card or RFID based, depend
on ECC to provide security. Hence, an additional level of defense need be added to these
protocols to assure increased security towards MITM, database and clogging attacks.
6.3 Directions of Future Research
Research on elliptic curve cryptography authentication protocols is ongoing. This re-
search has been conducted using static analysis. An obvious next step is to test the dy-
namic vulnerability of these protocols. The documentation presented here will lay the
groundwork for performing dynamic analysis on ECC based protocols. This documen-
– 55 –
tation provides detailed steps and procedures to perform static analysis. Our suggested
countermeasures on strengthening the security flaws in the above protocols will pro-
vide a strong basis to perform dynamic analysis. Other kinds of security flaws could
potentially be discovered while performing dynamic analysis.
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